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Abstract. Suppose that the private key of discrete logarithm-based or
factoring-based public-key primitive is obtained by concatenating the
outputs of a linear congruential generator. How seriously is the scheme
weakened as a result?
While linear congruential generators are cryptographically very weak
“pseudorandom” number generators, the answer to that question is not
immediately obvious, since an adversary in such a setting does not get
to examine the outputs of the congruential generator directly, but can
only obtain an implicit hint about them—namely the public key.
In this paper, we take a closer look at that problem, and show that, in
most cases, an attack does exist to retrieve the key much faster than
with a naive exhaustive search on the seed of the generator.
The problem is similar to the one considered by Bellare, Goldwasser
and Micciancio regarding DSA and “pseudorandomness”, and this line
of work arguably has renewed relevance in view of the sensitive role that
random number generation has been found to play in a number of recent
noted papers, such as the one by Lenstra et al. at CRYPTO 2012.
Keywords: linear congruential generator, discrete logarithm, factoring,
cryptanalysis
1 Introduction
Recently Lenstra et al. have proposed a sanity check of public keys collected on
the web [20] and concluded that generating secure public keys in the real world is
challenging. A related study by Heninger et al. [17] pointed in particular to the
role of (pseudo)randomness generation as the chief cause for the weak keys ob-
served in the wild. Cryptographers have to look at the security of pseudorandom
generators used to generate the secret keys.
Pseudorandom generators are one of the main component of security products
and their importance for security is hard to overestimate. A number of practical
attacks stem from problems with randomness generators. Indeed, it is difficult to
obtain randomness on computers and embedded devices, which tend to aggregate
various more or less reliable sources of entropy (mouse movements, passwords,
network interrupts, electronic noise) and use pseudorandom number generators
to expand them into arbitrarily long, hopefully uniform-looking bit strings.
Such practical generators have been analyzed and a framework has been given
by Barak and Halevi [1] for the Linux generators, who discuss the importance of
the randomness collector which maintains a state of enough entropy and an ex-
traction function whose aims is to output random bitstring from the state, which
is then expanded into an arbitrarily long pseudorandom string. Cryptographers
tend to concentrate on the second aspect: they assume that a pseudorandom
generator is seeded with a uniformly distributed bitstring and the goal of the
generator is to stretch the seed to a longer bitstring. They define security no-
tions and a generator is called secure if it is hard to distinguish its output from
uniformly distributed bitstring given the previous output bits.
The security of the first cryptographically secure generators has been based
on some number-theoretic hard problems, in the sense that the problem of distin-
guishing the outputs from uniform is reduced to a number-theoretic problem. In
1981, Shamir proposed one generator based on the strong RSA problem in [25];
Blum and Micali proposed a generator based on the discrete logarithm prob-
lem [5]; Blum, Blum and Shub proposed a generator based on the factorization
problem in [4]; and Micali and Schnorr defined another generator based on the
problem of distinguishing small e-th root modulo a RSA modulus from uniform
values in [23].
These generators are interesting from a theoretical point of view, but they
are rather inefficient and in practice more efficient generators using symmetric
cryptographic functions have been preferred. For instance, ISO and NIST pro-
pose generators using symmetric primitives such as hash functions and block
ciphers, which are more efficient and can be modeled as random oracles, ideal
ciphers, pseudorandom functions or permutations. In [14], Desai et al. proved
the security of these symmetric primitive-based generators, provided that the
underlying primitives satisfy certain standard assumptions.
Linear Congruential Generators. Cryptographers have also studied the se-
curity of the linear congruential generators (LCG), widely used in simulation.
These generators are efficient and have a very small memory footprint. Moreover,
with suitable parameters, they can have good statistical properties such as a large
period length and their output distribution is uniform. As they are also very easy
to implement, they tend to be used in the standard libraries of many languages
and compilers: the rand function proposed in the POSIX standard and the ones
used in many C/C++ standard libraries, Java’s java.util.Random, most im-
plementations of RAND in Fortran, etc. Their efficiency and ubiquity make them
attractive to implementors, especially in constrained environments, even in some
security-sensitive applications.
Unfortunately, LCGs are cryptographically insecure: Boyar [9] proved that,
with a sufficiently long run of the pseudorandom sequence, one can recover the
seed in polynomial time in the size of the internal state and Stern [26] proved
that this is also the case even if only the most significant bits of each successive
states is revealed (see also [8,19,16]). These attacks are based on lattice reduc-
tion, usually LLL [21]. However, Contini and Shparlinski have proposed a careful
analysis of these algorithms in [12] and established some limits to their appli-
cability, indicating that with properly chosen parameters, the generator might
become secure.
Related Work. In any case, these attacks assume that the adversary has direct
access to a certain number of outputs (although the parameters of the gener-
ator may remain unknown). As a result, using such a cryptographically weak
generator in a cryptographic protocol does not automatically make the resulting
protocol insecure, because an adversary against the protocol may not have ac-
cess to the actual outputs of the generator. This led Bellare et al. [2] to analyze
the security of the Digital Signature Algorithm (DSA) when the random nonces
used in signature generation are computed using a linear congruential generator.
They showed that this does seriously break security: a few signatures are enough
to recover the secret key. This started an important line of research on the se-
curity of DSA when partial information on the nonces is revealed. For instance,
Smart and Howgrave-Graham [18] and later Nguyen and Shparlinski [24] showed
that the knowledge of a small number of the most significant bits of the nonces
allows to efficiently recover the secret key using LLL. Bleichenbacher even estab-
lished [3] that the bias on the single most significant bit of the nonce that occurs
when using some version of the NIST generator can be sufficient to efficiently
recover the secret key.
Our contributions. In this paper, we investigate a question similar to the one
considered by Bellare et al. but in a different direction than the DSA crypt-
analysis papers. We consider the problem of the security of public-key schemes
based on the hardness of the discrete logarithm problem or the factoring problem
when the secret keys are constructed by concatenating the outputs of a linear
congruential generator. Since the attacker does not get those outputs directly,
but only an implicit hint, namely the corresponding public key, recovering the
secret key is not trivial even if a cryptographically weak generator such as the
LCG is used. We show that this is usually enough to recover the secret key much
faster than using the trivial exhaustive search on the seed of the generator.
Our attack relies on the assumption that the secret key is obtained as the
concatenation of successive outputs of a linear congruential generator. We also
assume as is usual in cryptography that the parameters of the LCG are public
and therefore an exhaustive search on the seed allows to recover the secret key
in time 2k where k is the size of the seed. Typical parameters for the LCG are
32 bits or 64 bits internal state to allow fast implementation without using a
library for large integer arithmetic. The main observation of our work is that
if we split the seed of size k into two parts (A · 2k/2 + B) where A and B are
(k/2)-bit long, the linearity of the LCG makes it “almost” possible to write the
secret key as a sum U + V · 2k/2 where U (respectively V ) only depends on B
(resp. A) and the parameters of the LCG. This is correct up to carries, which
do occur but can be taken care of separately. As a result, we can obtain a time-
memory tradeoff on the search for the LCG seed when such generators are used
to generate the secret key of a discrete logarithm-based scheme or to the prime
factors of an RSA modulus. The discrete logarithm case is mainly a baby-step
giant-step attack on the lower and upper halves of the seed, while the factoring
case proceeds similarly using multipoint polynomial evaluation.
The main advantage of these attacks is that they allow key recovery from
the public key alone, independently of any further information on the underlying
cryptographic schemes.
Organization of the paper. The paper is organized as follows. After some
preliminaries in §2, we present our attack in the discrete logarithm case in §3 and
in the factoring case in §4. Finally, in §5, we give an overview of the complexity
of our attacks for typical parameter sizes.
2 Preliminaries
We first recall the definition of the linear congruential generator and fix some
notations which will be used in the following sections; then we briefly discus-
sion multipoint evaluation of univariate polynomials, which will be used in the
factoring case.
2.1 Linear congruential generator
For M an integer of size m bits, we denote by ZM the ring of integers modulo
M . The internal state of a linear congruential generator evolves according to the
following recurrence relation:
vi+1 = a · vi + b modM (1)
where a and b are fixed constant in ZM (the parameters of the generator) and
v0 = s is the secret seed. The successive outputs oi of the generator are the k least
(or most) significant bits vi at each iteration (for some fixed k ∈ {1, . . . ,m}).
Note that the recurrence equation is easily solved as:
vi = a
i · s+ b · (1 + a+ · · ·+ ai−1) = ai · s+ bi (mod M). (2)
The following attacks rely on the assumption that a certain secret x is com-
puted as a concatenation of successive outputs of such a linear congruential
generator, with known parameters a, b and M . In other words, x can be written
as:
x = o0 + 2
ko1 + · · ·+ 2(r−1)kor−1 (3)
for some fixed constant r. The secret x is then of size rk bits.
2.2 Multipoint evaluation of univariate polynomials
Let P (x) ∈ ZN [x], with N an arbitrary integer, be a polynomial of degree
less than d = 2k. The multipoint evaluation problem is the task of evaluating
P at d distinct points α0, . . . , αd−1 ∈ ZN . Using Horner’s rule, it is easy to
propose a solution that uses O(d2) additions and multiplications in ZN but it
is well-known that one can propose an algorithm with quasi-linear complexity
O˜(d) operations in ZN using a divide-and-conquer approach [15]; a better, more
involved algorithm based on the middle product of polynomials has later been
proposed in some special cases by Bostan and Schost [7,6]. That observation has
found several applications in cryptanalysis [11,13].
A succinct description of the classical approach, based on product and re-
mainder trees of polynomials is given in Appendix A. The complexity T (d) of
the recursive algorithm satisfies T (d) = 2T (d/2)+O(M(d)), whereM(i) denotes
the arithmetic complexity to compute the product of two polynomials of degree
i in ZN [x], and therefore T (d) = O(M(d) log d).
3 The discrete logarithm case
We now consider key generation in a public-key scheme whose security is related
to the discrete logarithm problem in some cyclic group G of prime order q and
generator g. Typically, for such a scheme, G, q and g are public parameters, the
secret key contains a random element x ∈ Zq, and h = gx is revealed as part of
the public key.
Assume that x is obtained from the outputs of a linear congruential generator
of known parameters, as in Equation (1). The problem is to recover x from the
public data faster than by an exhaustive search on the seed s.
Our approach in a nutshell is as follows. Separate the seed in its lower-order
and higher-order halves: s = u + 2k/2 · v (we can assume for simplicity’s sake
that k is even). Then, by Equation (1), the internal state of the generator can
be written as:
vi =
(
ai · u+ 2k/2 · ai · v + bi
)
modM.
Thus, the corresponding output oi can essentially be written, in turn, as the
sum of a part depending only on u and another part depending only on v—
only “essentially” because of possible carry bits and of possible overflows in the
addition modulo M , but this can be taken care of, and we will ignore that for
the moment.
Then, x is itself of the form x = U + V where U is a publicly computable
function of u, and V of v. In the group G, this gives h = gU ·gV , or equivalently:
gU = h · g−V .
Now, in time and space O(2k/2), we can find a collision between the lists of
elements of G of the form gU for all 2k/2 possible values of u on the one hand,
and h ·g−V for all 2k/2 possible values of v on the other hand, and hence recover
the secret x = U + V .
The real algorithm has a slightly higher complexity due to the need to take
carries and overflows into account, which we work out below first when M = 2k
(the output is the full internal state) and then in the general case.
Note that since the parameters a and b are known, the constants bi can be
computed publicly and are thus irrelevant to the attack. To simplify notations,
we can thus assume without loss of generality that b = 0.
Remark 1. The attack discussed here is generic and can of course be carried
out in any cyclic group: it applies to (subgroups of) the multiplicative group of
a finite field and to elliptic curves or abelian varieties alike. In the case of an
elliptic curve group, the problem is to recover a secret value x from two points
P,Q such that Q = xP , and when x is obtained from a linear congruential
generator as before, it is again possible to divide x into two parts U and V , the
first depending on u, the second on v. We can find a collision by checking an
equality of the form Q− UP = V P .
3.1 Attack for non-truncated linear congruential generators
We first work out the details of this attack for a non-truncated linear congruential
generator, which satisfies that M = 2k. The non-truncated linear congruential
generator is the most efficient of the linear congruential generator in the sense
that it outputs the maximal number of available bits at each iteration.
Theorem 1. Given two group elements g, h ∈ G with h = gx, where x is an
(r · k)-bit exponent generated with a non-truncated linear congruential generator
with public parameters and k-bit state, there exists an algorithm which retrieves
the secret x in time and memory O(2
k+r
2 ).
Proof. As mentioned previously, we may assume without loss of generality that
the LCG has parameters such that b = 0. By Equation (2), its successive outputs
are thus of the form:
oi = vi = (a
i · s) modM = (ai · s) mod 2k.
Now write the seed as s = u+ 2k/2 · v, with u, v of k/2 bits. We get:
oi =
(
ai · (u+ 2k/2 · v)) mod 2k.
We can expand that expression for oi using the following elementary lemma.
Lemma 1. For all α, β, γ ∈ Z, γ 6= 0, there exists ε ∈ {0, 1} such that:
(α+ β) mod γ = (α mod γ) + (β mod γ)− εγ.
Proof. Indeed, let L = (α+β) mod γ and R = (α mod γ)+(β mod γ). Clearly, L
and R are congruent modulo γ, so they must differ by a multiple of γ. Moreover,
0 ≤ L < γ and 0 ≤ R < 2γ, hence −γ < R − L < 2γ, so R − L must be of the
form ε · γ with ε ∈ {0, 1} as required. ⊓⊔
Thus, for all indexes i (and any choice of the two seed halves u, v), there
exists εi ∈ {0, 1} such that:
oi = (a
i · u mod 2k) + (ai · 2k/2v mod 2k)− εi · 2k
= (ai · u) mod 2k + 2k/2(ai · v mod 2k/2)− εi · 2k.
If u and v are the two halves of the correct seed used to generate x, summing
the 2ikoi yields, according to Equation (3):
x = U + V − Y
where:
U =
r−1∑
i=0
2ik · (aiu mod 2k)
V =
r−1∑
i=0
2ik+k/2 · (aiv mod 2k/2)
Y =
r−1∑
i=0
2(i+1)k · εi.
We can also decompose Y into a sum W +Z where each of W and Z consist of
r/2 terms, and obtain the relation U − Z = x+W − V , or equivalently:
gU−Z = h · gW−V . (4)
We can thus recover x by finding a collision between two lists of 2
k+r
2 elements
of G, namely the gU−Z (for all values of the half-seed u and all possible choices
of the bits εi in Z) on the one hand, and the h · gW−Z (for all values of the
half-seed v and all possible choices of the bits εi in W ) on the other. Using hash
tables, this can be achieved in time and space O(2
k+r
2 ).
More precisely, one first computes the 2k/2 possible values Ui, the 2
r/2 pos-
sible values Zj and stores i, j in a hash table under the key g
Ui−Zj . This table
contains 2
k+r
2 different values accessible in constant time. Then one computes
the 2k/2 possible values Vs, the 2
r/2 possible values Wt and tests, for each of
them, whether h · gWt−Vs is a key of the hash table. When the test succeeds, one
obtains the correct values of u and v and can deduce the value x. The attack is
summarized in Algorithm 1. ⊓⊔
Algorithm 1 Attack overview
Require: q, g, h = gx, a, b, M
Ensure: x such as h = gx
Compute the hash table H by storing i, j at H(gUi−Zj )
for each (Vs,Wt) do
if H(h · gWt−Vs) exists then
return x← Ui + Vs − Zj −Wt
end if
end for
3.2 Attack for truncated linear congruential generators
We now consider a truncated linear congruential generator with a modulusM >
2k of size m (with m < rk). It is typically less efficient than the non-truncated
one, but may have better properties in statistical and security terms. The attack
we obtain has a slightly worse complexity than in the non-truncated setting.
Theorem 2. Given two group elements g, h ∈ G with h = gx, where x is an
(r · k)-bit exponent generated with a truncated linear congruential generator out-
putting the k most (or least) significant bits at each iteration, with public param-
eters and m-bit state, there exists an algorithm which retrieves the secret x in
time and memory O(2m/2 · 5r/2).
Proof. The principle of the attack remains similar however the carry is in a
larger set of values. As a consequence the complexity in time and in memory is
increased. Indeed, starting from Equation (2) with b = 0, the successive outputs
are now of the form:
oi = vi mod 2
k =
(
(ai · s) modM) mod 2k
in the case where the least significant bits are output, and:
oi = vi ≫ (m− k) =
(
(ai · s) modM)≫ (m− k)
in the most significant bits case. By writing s as u+ 2m/2v, we get:
vi =
(
ai · (u+ 2m/2 · v)) modM.
and Lemma 1 ensures that:
(ai · u) modM + 2m/2(ai · v modM) = vi or vi +M.
Using the same lemma and the fact that oi = vi mod 2
k (LSB case), we obtain:
(ai ·u modM) mod 2k+(2m/2 ·ai ·v modM) mod 2k =


oi
oi + 2
k
oi + (M mod 2
k)
oi + (M mod 2
k) + 2k
oi + (M mod 2
k)− 2k
In the MSB case, we have (by denoting j = m− k) oi = vi ≫ j and thus:
(ai · u modM)≫ j + (2m/2 · ai · v modM)≫ j =


oi
oi − 1
oi + (M ≫ j)
oi + (M ≫ j) + 1
oi + (M ≫ j)− 1
Therefore, by applying the attack as before and using Equation (4), we have to
find a collision between two sets of 2m/2 · 5r/2, the factor 2m/2 coming from the
search of U (respectively V ) and the factor 5r/2 coming from the search of Z
(respectively W ). ⊓⊔
4 The factoring case
The attacks extend to public-key schemes whose security is related to the hard-
ness of factoring, or of the RSA problem.
Denoting p and q two secret primes obtained from outputs of a linear con-
gruential generator, and N the resulting product published as part of the public
key, we would like to find p and q given N and the parameters of the generator.
The idea is again to separate the seed into a lower-order and a higher-order
part, and to obtain a time-memory tradeoff compared to exhaustive search. The
key ingredient is multipoint polynomial evaluation.
4.1 Basic prime generation
We first consider a prime number generation algorithm (see [22]) which consists
in, from a random seed, computing the required number of outputs, concate-
nating them and using a probabilistic primality test such as Miller-Rabin or a
deterministic one such as the AKS primality test. If the test fails, one selects
another random seed and restarts the algorithm: all primality tests are indepen-
dent.
As before, we consider the case where the linear congruential generator is not
truncated and the case where it is truncated.
Theorem 3. Given a RSA modulus N with N = pq, where p is an (r · k)-
bit prime generated with a non-truncated linear congruential generator (resp. a
truncated linear congruential generator outputting the k most or least significant
bits at each iteration), with public parameters and k-bit state (resp. m-bit state),
there exists an algorithm which factorizes N in time and memory O˜(2
k+r
2 ) (resp.
O˜(2m/2 · 5r/2)) with overwhelming probability.
Proof. For simplicity, we will treat the case of the non-truncated LCG since the
use of a truncated one implies only a difference in the exhaustive search of the
carry. By splitting the seed as s = u+2k/2 · v, we can write p as p = U + V − Y
with:
U =
r−1∑
i=0
2ik(aiu mod 2k)
V =
r−1∑
i=0
2ik(2k/2(aiv mod 2k/2))
Y =
r−1∑
i=0
2(i+1)k · εi.
We can also cut Y into two r/2-bit elements W,Z. Let us denote A = U−Z and
B = V −W and suppose having c(A+B) mod N = cp mod N with c an integer.
Then, except the rare case where c is a multiple of q, this value is necessarily
a multiple of p. Indeed cp mod pq can only have the values 0 (case where q|c),
p, · · · , (q−1)p. Thus, a greater common divisor computation (GCD) with N will
reveal p.
As an attacker, one does not have access to the correct value of the seed.
Since u and v can take 2k/2 distinct values, one can compute the same amount
of values U and V . Moreover there are 2r/2 possibilities for W and Z. In other
words, the values A = U − Z and B = V −W are in two sets of 2 k+r2 elements
and we have to find a test in order to determine the good ones.
More precisely, one first computes the 2
k+r
2 different values Bs,t by generating
the values Vs and Wt and we consider the following polynomial of degree 2
k+r
2 :
P (X) =
∏
s,t
(X +Bs,t) mod N
Then one computes the 2
k+r
2 possible values Ai,j by generating the values Ui
and Zj and proceeds a multi-evaluation of the polynomial P at the points Ai,j .
The result is a set of 2
k+r
2 values of the form:{∏
s,t
(Ai,j +Bs,t) mod N | i = 0, · · · , 2k/2 − 1, j = 0, · · · , 2r/2 − 1
}
.
Finally one has to compute a test to detect the correct values A and B. It is
done by computing a GCD between each value (Ai,j) and the public modulus
N . Since all the values of the seed and all the values of the carry are efficiently
tested, the prime p will be recovered except if P (A) is equal to 0. However this
failure case is extremely rare: it requires that at least one of the d − 1 integers
composing the product with p is the prime q. The probability is thus equal to
d−1
2log q
. The attack is summarized in Algorithm 2. ⊓⊔
Algorithm 2 Attack overview (case M = 2k)
Require: N = pq, a, b, M
Ensure: p such as N = pq
Generate the polynomial P (X) =
∏
s,t
(X + Vs −Wt) mod N
Multi-evaluate P at the points Ai,j = Ui − Zj
for each point Ai,j do
if gcd(P (Ai,j), N) 6= 1 then
return gcd(P (Ai,j), N)
end if
end for
4.2 Improved prime generation
Since there is no link between each probabilistic primality test in the first prime
number generating algorithm, the failed tests are useless and free of cost from
the point of view of the attacker. We now propose another one with a link by
using a counter.
PRIMEINC Method. The PRIMEINC algorithm is a prime number gener-
ating algorithm proposed by Brandt and Damg˚ard in [10] which basically picks
a random number and increases it until a prime is found. In other words, if p
is not a prime (but odd), then p = p + 2 and repeat. According to the prime
number theorem, we expect to find a prime number after log p trials on average.
Corollary 1. Considering the two cases of Theorem 3 coupled with the PRIMEINC
algorithm, there exists an algorithm which factorizes N in time and memory
O˜(2
k+r
2 ) (resp. O˜(2m/2 · 5r/2)) with overwhelming probability.
Proof. In our attack, we now search the correct value of p such as p = A+B+2ǫ
with ǫ ∈ {0, · · · , log p} (see Remark 2 for the size of the set). Thus, after the
multi-evaluation, our algorithm should have computed a set covering the entire
space of search as follows:
{∏
s,t
(Ai,j +Bs,t + 2γ) mod N | i ≤ 2k/2 − 1, j ≤ 2r/2 − 1, γ ≤ log p
}
.
An efficient way to compute the search of the correct value of γ (i.e. γ = ǫ)
consists in applying the same trick as before, i.e. writing γ as γ = γMSB + γLSB
by splitting the bits into two parts.
In other words, in the first part of the algorithm, one computes the different
values Bs,t and the
√
log p values of γLSB . In the second part, one focus on
the different values Ai,j and the
√
log p values of γMSB . Thus, after the multi-
evaluation, the resulted set corresponds to 2
k+r
2
√
log p values of the form (case
M = 2k): ∏
s,t,γ
(Ai,j +Bs,t + 2(γMSB + γLSB)) mod N.
With overwhelming probability, the value containing p does not contain q too
and the test using the greatest common divisor will reveal p.
The modification due to the PRIMEINC method thus increases the complex-
ity in time and in memory by a factor of
√
log p, which disappears in the O˜ since√
log p = O(
√
rk) = O
(
r+k
2
)
. ⊓⊔
Remark 2. Brandt and Damg˚ard prove in [10] that the failure is about equal to
e−2ℓ when applying ℓ · log p iterations of the PRIMEINC algorithm. In the proof,
we put ℓ = 1, leading to a success rate of 86%.
5 Complexity estimates for concrete parameter sizes
Table 1 below presents the time complexity of our attack in the discrete loga-
rithm case for typical parameter LCG sizes, as found in implementation of the
random functions of common compilers and standard libraries, namely a modu-
lus equal to either 232 or 264 (so that modular addition and multiplication can
be implemented as simple operations on standard size registers), and an output
size equal to either the full modulus size or half of it (corresponding to the top
or bottom half of the state). The complexities are to be compared with that of
the trivial attack: exhaustive search on seed.
Remark 3. Note that the differences of complexity between a linear congruential
generator which outputs the least significant bits or the most significant bits
is due to the fact that there are only three possibilities for the value of (ai ·
u modM) mod 2k + (2m/2 · ai · v modM) mod 2k. Indeed, taking M = 232 or
M = 264 yields M mod 2k = 0.
Remark 4. In a few cases, for 16-bit output size, the complexity is in fact worse
than the exhaustive search on the seed. This happens in the truncated case only,
when r (the number of LCG outputs used to construct the secret) is particularly
large, namely when 5r/2 (MSB case), resp. 3r/2 (LSB case), is greater than 2m/2.
Remark 5. In the factoring case, the complexities are larger by a logarithmic
factor, from the use of quasilinear multipoint polynomial evaluation.
Secret size Modulus Output size Attack complexity
160 232 32 218.5
160 232 16 223.9 227.7
160 264 64 233.5
160 264 32 236 237.8
256 232 32 220
256 232 16 228.7 234.6
256 264 64 234
256 264 32 238.3 241.3
512 232 32 224
512 232 16 241.4 253.2
512 264 64 236
512 264 32 244.7 250.6
1024 264 64 240
2048 264 64 248
Table 1. Overview of our Attacks complexities in the discrete logarithm case. When
the output size is smaller than the modulus, the first number corresponds to the LSB
case, and the second one to the MSB case.
6 Conclusion
In this paper, we present new key-recovery attacks on discrete logarithm and
factoring-based public-key schemes whose private keys are generated by con-
catenating the outputs of a linear congruential generator. Even though the LCG
itself is known to be a cryptographically weak pseudorandom generator, it is not
a priori obvious that its use would make key generation insecure, as its outputs
are never revealed in clear to an adversary. It turns out, however, that the im-
plicit hint about those outputs provided by the public key is enough to recover
the private key significantly faster than with an exhaustive search on the seed.
It is hoped that this attack can be generalized to other, less naive pseudo-
random generators in further work. Moreover, even in the case of the LCG, it
would be interesting to extend it to different scenarios, such as the generation
of randomness used in padding functions for encryption and signatures, or to
settings where LCG parameters are unknown to the attacker.
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A Multipoint evaluation of univariate polynomials
Here is a succinct description of the classical approach, based on product and
remainder trees of polynomials. Let P0 =
∏d/2−1
ℓ=0 (x−αℓ) and P1 =
∏d−1
ℓ=d/2(x−
αℓ) and let us define R0 = P mod P0 and R1 = P mod P1. We have R0(αi) =
P (αi) for all i ∈ {0, . . . , d/2− 1} and R1(αi) = P (αi) for all i ∈ {d/2, . . . , d− 1}
and this gives immediately a recursive algorithm (i.e. compute P0, P1, R0, R1
and reduce the problem to the multipoint evaluation of R0 and R1 of degree
d/2 = 2k−1).
Let Ai(x) = (x−αi) for i ∈ {0, . . . , d−1} and Pi,j = Aj2iAj2i+1 . . . Aj2i+2i−1
for i ∈ {0, . . . , k} and 0 ≤ j < 2k−i. We have P0,j = Aj and Pi+1,j = Pi,2jPi,2j+1
so for i ∈ {0, . . . , k} we can compute recursively all polynomials Pi,j and 0 ≤ j <
2k−i in 2k−i−1O(M(2i)) = O(M(d)) operations in ZN where M(i) denotes the
arithmetic complexity to compute the product of two polynomials of degree i in
ZN [x]. Overall, the computation of all polynomials Pi,j requires O(M(d) log d)
operations in ZN .
The polynomials R0 and R1 can be computed using O(M(d)) operations in
ZN (using a Newton inversion), hence the complexity T (d) of the recursive algo-
rithm satisfies T (d) = 2T (d/2) +O(M(d)) and therefore T (d) = O(M(d) log d).
